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CHAPTER 22

NATIONALISM IN THE ERA
OF THE NATION STATE,

1870-1945
PIETER M. JUDSON

Under the first German nation state (1870-1945), nationalism became a more potent

and, occasionally, a destabilizing force in politics and social life than it had previously
been in German society. With the creation of a German nation state, governments and
administrators began to treat nationalism as a legitimate tool for the promotion of their
official policies at the same time that all manner of activists, politicians, journalists, and
reformers used nationalist rhetoric to legitimate their diverse programs for Germany
and claims on the state. Although nationalists’ programs sought to forge social stability
by unifying Germans divided by region, class, and confession in a national community,
their activism could produce the opposite effect. Issues such as the national interest,
membership in the nation, or the state’s effectiveness at pursuing the national interest
became at times the subjects of heated public debate with a potential to produce
political instability. Debates such as these were hardly new to German society, but
after 1870 issues such as the character of the German nation or membership in the
national community became legal and administrative questions, not simply subjects of
political or philosophical discussion. Germany’s rulers often found themselves walking
a fine line between encouraging a nationalist activism they believed could help to unify
the new German society and dampening nationalism’s more radical manifestations.
This balancing act became especially apparent around 1900 as nationalists increasingly
used mass appeals tinged with ideological radicalism to question the ability of Ger
many’s conservative rulers to represent the interests of the national community
adequately and effectively.
For many years historians viewed nationalism as a tool wielded largely by Germany’s
highly conservative rulers for the purpose of manipulating political life in a rapidly
industrializing society. Nationalist and patriotic enthusiasm in Imperial German
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society, it was believed, had papered over growing differences among interest groups by
deflecting popular attention away from social and economic complaints.* This argu
ment saw Germany’s pursuit of an ambitious colonial policy in the i88os and 1890s, and
its increasingly aggressive foreign policy choices after 1900, as products of a dangerous
attempt by the elite to incite nationalist feeling and thereby master the domestic
political opposition. There are two obvious disadvantages to viewing German nation
alism in this framework. In the first place, while it may be tempting to see nationalism
largely in terms of the policies and practices of the nation state, doing so would hide
from view the vitality of social movements in an age of mass politics that wrapped their
own claims against the state in the mantle of nationalism. Popular nationalism in
Germany was far more a product of the imaginative rhetorical and organizational
strategies devised by activists than it was a product of state manipulation. In the second
place, viewing nationalism as a product of elite manipulation forces us to view it as a
fundamentally unifying force in society, rather than seeing its often unpredictable and
destabilizing dynamic qualities.
The proclamation of the German Empire in 1871 transformed the challenges
Germany’s small and relatively elite groups of nationalists had recently faced. With
the birth of the federal German state nationalists transferred their efforts from the
achievement of political unification to the creation of a unified national society. They
continued to justify their programs by claiming to speak for the national community
even as their key goal was to create such a community in the first place. From the start,
the project of nationalizing Germany’s citizens faced several unexpected obstacles. At
first, existing regional loyalties and popular devotion to familiar symbols, rituals, and
practices of local politics (not necessarily to local regimes) continued to provide many
educated Germans with a more compelling sense of identification than did an unfa
miliar German nation state dominated by Prussia. To local observers, the dimensions
and qualities of the new Germany often seemed more abstract than real. Despite
aggressive nationalist propaganda churned out by reputable historians, writers, and
journalists, segments of the educated population in parts of Baden, Saxony, Bavaria, or
Wurttemberg viewed the German nation state with skepticism, often precisely because
the new state broke so dramatically with familiar practices and traditions.^
The challenge to nationalists was to produce and popularize a unifying idea that
would attract German citizens of diverse backgrounds, religions, and regional practices.
However, in the early years after 1871, most nationalists produced relatively narrow and
triumphalist understandings of the German national community. The qualities that
defined Germanness for these early activists derived largely from their own Protestant
religious affiliation and bourgeois class experience.^ Most nationalists had belonged to
National Liberal parties in the various federal states; they were men who had agitated
for small-German {kleindeutsch) unification under Prussia for two decades. Their
efforts tended to reach a limited public for whom bourgeois and Protestant narratives
of nationhood already held a kind of common sense persuasiveness.^ In their efforts
the National Liberals profited enormously from their political collaboration with the
Prussian leader Otto von Bismarck, architect of unification and Chancellor of the new
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Germany. In the 1870s Bismarck’s policies directed against the Catholic hierarchy (the
so-called Kulturkampf) appeared to lend government support to a particular liberal
and Protestant conviction about what constituted German nationhood. It encouraged
the National Liberals to question openly whether Germany’s Catholics could ever
legitimately be considered part of the national community. The government’s persecu
tion of clerics, newspaper editors, and laymen, who had allegedly defied the new laws,
not only produced a popular Catholic backlash, but also confirmed for many Germans
that the new nation was in fact a narrowly partisan Liberal and Prussian creation.®
Their desire to diminish the influence of political Catholicism, especially in the
Southern German states and among Polish-speakers in the East, was only one concern
that animated the liberals to support the Kulturkampf. Liberal enthusiasm for the
Kulturkampf ultimately derived less from questions of Church state relations than
from deeper presumptions about the nation’s fundamental values. Liberal Protestant
writers habitually associated Catholicism with a culture of feminine dependence
unworthy of a nation of independent citizens because it allegedly subjected people to
an absolutist form of belief and political rule. By contrast, the liberals’ vision of the new
Germany rested on a middle-class masculine ideal of personal independence and active
citizenship that they explicitly associated with their Protestant beliefs. Liberals also
accused Catholicism of fostering international loyalties at the expense of national ones,
loyalties that they also associated with Germany’s linguistic minorities, most of whom
also happened to be Catholics. Along with the taint of their alleged indifference to the
national community, liberal writers also associated both Catholicism and linguistic
diversity with ignorance, superstition, economic backwardness, and untoward foreign
influence. Some liberals like historian Heinrich von Treitschke doubted that a society
troubled by religious and ethnic diversity could ever succeed as a national society.® As
an illustration of this fear they pointed to the Habsburg Monarchy whose Catholic
status and linguistic diversity allegedly required the imposition of absolutist forms of
rule that they considered unworthy of Germany’s free citizens.^
National liberal efforts to forge a more unified nation of Germans that rejected
religious and ethnic diversity merely intensified ideological division at every level of
society. In political terms, the Kulturkampf helped create a mass-based Catholic Center
Party that sought to unite German Catholics of all classes and regions in defense
against state persecution. In social and cultural terms the Kulturkampf also produced
popular irritation and some suspicion against the very idea of nation. To some
Germans the public invocations of the ‘nation’ in local rituals implied the Liberals’
particular version of nationhood, and this is reflected in accounts of failed local
celebrations of national unity in the 1870s and early 1880s. While specific commemora
tions of the war against France appealed to most Germans, for example, they tended to
view annual Sedan day celebrations as National Liberal events.®
Over time, the end to the Kulturkampf policies, and the increasing experience of
living in a German nation state made nationalism a more popular phenomenon
throughout Germany. By the 1890s nationalists had more successfully linked inclusive
concepts of nation to familiar local traditions and loyalties.® With the waning of the
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the i88os, the goals of the state in propagating nationalist values and
ideologies had also parted company from the efforts of the early nationalist activists.
Reversing course, the state gradually sought to integrate Germany’s Catholics more
fully into the national community. Official state nationalism sought to stabilize society
by minimizing the confessional and regional conflicts of an earlier era and by unifying
different social forces around policies that appealed specifically to nationalist or
patriotic sentiment. Some versions of this Sammlungspolitik tried to unify differing
groups on the basis of their common support for German colonialism, or, more
frequently, on the basis of their common hostility to internationalist socialism. By
the 1890s, the rhetorical challenges posed by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) to the
regime offered Germany’s chancellors promising new opportunities to build coalitions
among a broad array of groups whose joint antipathy to socialism purchased a tenuous

Kulturkampf in

nationalist unity.
Despite the ideological attractions of this Sammlungspolitik, many nationalist acti
vists and organizations refused to follow the lead of the state, treating such initiatives
with caution and even with cynicism and suspicion. Those activists who had seen
Catholicism as a fundamental danger to the German nation, for example, did not
simply abandon their anti-Catholicism just because Bismarck had done so. At issue for
them was not national unification, but rather the terms under which it would be
accomplished; not the national community as a fact, but the way that this community
was to be imagined.i“ Many Protestant liberals continued to assert their highly specific
vision of the nation for Germany, warning that accommodation with Catholicism
would undermine precisely those qualities that made the German nation distinctive
and strong. In 1887, for example, the founders of an organization designed to build
support for this perspective, the Protestant League, typically asserted that while gov
ernment concessions to Catholics might purchase a degree of national unity, it would
be at the cost of subverting the very character and identity of the nation.
In the 1880s, thanks largely to Bismarck’s enormous personal prestige in nationalist
circles, this kind of rivalry between proponents of state and more narrowly defined
forms of nationalism had remained muted. Another issue that rallied nationalists
behind the state and where both appeared to share a more ethnic definition of nation
was in their common desire for a Germanization of Prussia’s Eastern provinces in the
1880s. In 1871 Germany’s Polish-speakers had comprised around 6% of the population
of the new state.“ This seemingly small percentage masked the fact that in severd
Prussian districts, Polish speakers constituted over 80% of the population, Bismarck s
pursuit of the Kulturkampf in the 1870s had derived in part from his concern
about potential resistance to the new state from Polish-speaking Catholics. Many of
Bismarck’s subsequent policies, including limiting the use of Polish language m the
public sphere and weakening the influence of the Catholic Church, constituted forcible
attempts to assimilate Germany’s Polish-speaking citizens into a German national
community.i^ When these measures failed over time to produce the desired results,
however, Bismarck sought to diminish the size of the Polish-speaking popula
tion through even harsher measures that included the outright deportation of
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(non-citizen) migrant laborers to Russia. To support these ends the Prussian govern
ment had long pursued a small-scale policy of German ethnic land colonization in the
East, founding a Royal Prussian Settlement Commission in 1866 that bought land held
by Polish estate owners, divided it up, and sold parcels at subsidized rates to German
farmers from the West.^'* Over time, however, the colonization policy had aggravated
relations between the more radical nationalists and traditional conservatives in Prussia.
Conservatives especially large estate owners—relied on cheap Polish-speaking migrant
labor from Russia and opposed nationalist demands to end this practice. Radical nation
alists meanwhile, dissatisfied with the small-scale efforts of the colonization commission,
demanded an end to the migration of cheap labor into Germany and the forcible division
of more Polish estates into family-sized plots to benefit German settlers.
The government’s ambivalent policies—what nationalists would call half measreflected its attempt to balance its concerns about the potentially subversive
activities of Polish nationalist activists against the need for agricultural labor on the
great estates. However the nationalist presumption (German or Polish) that use of the
Polish language somehow expressed an individual’s Polish national loyalty or rejection
of Germany reflected a fundamental misreading of local conditions. Whether or to
what extent Poles (those with a sense of Polish national identity) and Polish-speakers in
Prussia identified with any nation is a question that cannot easily be answered, as
several local studies have demonstrated. The very idea of understanding Germany’s
Eastern borderland regions primarily in terms of a war to the death between Poles and
Germans was more often a projection by German and Polish nationalists of their own
thinking onto events in these regions. Many Polish speakers, for example, considered
themselves to be loyal citizens of Imperial Germany, and daily life in Silesia or Posen
bore little resemblance to the stories of eternal nationalist struggle propagated by
activists. Nor did long-term voting patterns in the East betray fundamental or authen
tic national loyalties. The degree to which Polish-speaking Prussians gave their votes to
Polish nationalist parties or to the (German) Catholic Center Party in Silesia, for
example, depended more on the situational ability of one or the other party to
represent issues of local concern, than on the national identification of their voters.^®
The government’s periodic bans on Polish language schools or the use of Polish in
public suggested that the government believed that Germany’s Polish-speakers could
become Germans over time, and that this would essentially solve what both nationalists
and the government saw as a national problem in the East. Nationalists in turn
supported the government’s harsh language policies, but they often held different
beliefs about the possibilities of assimilating Slavic peoples to the German nation.
Their ambivalence on this issue was itself a product of their own activism: the more
activists emphasized the distinctive nature of German ethnicity in the East, the less they
could imagine the successful Germanization of other peoples. If, indeed, Germans and
Poles fundamentally differed from each other, then policies of assimUation could
hardly resolve the national struggle.
After Bismarck’s resignation in 1890, his successors had appeared to relax many of
the regime’s harsher anti-Polish measures. With the iconic Bismarck gone, the more
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radical of the nationalist activists were far less reluctant to pressure, criticize, and
occasionally to attack the German government more openly. They organized several
nationalist associations designed to mobilize popular support for their diverse causes
and to lobby the government on a broad range of nationalist interests, not simply its
Eastern policies. The most successful and popular of these new organizations were the
General German School Association (1881) (later the Society for Germandom Abroad
or VDA), the Colonial Society (1887), the Pan German League (1891), the Society for
Germandom in the Eastern Marches (1894), and the Navy League (1898).
The Society for Germandom in the Eastern Marches, also known as the H-K-T after
its founders’ initials (von Hansemann, Kennemann, and von Tiedemann), agitated for
tougher policies against Polish speakers in Germany’s East. Within a year of its
founding the organization already boasted a membership of 20,000.1^ The association
raised money to support the work of the Royal Settlement Commission, and to furnish
needy towns and villages in the East with German language libraries, books, and
periodicals. It also disseminated virulently anti-Polish and anti-Catholic propaganda
framed as common-sense German nationalist arguments in its journal. Die Ostmark}^
Along with the Alldeutsche Blatter published by the Pan German League, Die Ostmark
played a dominant role in shaping radical nationalist opinion about Germany’s eastern
frontiers in other parts of the country as well. To the west in neighboring Saxony, for
example, the Alldeutsche Blatter attempted, albeit with little success, to raise the alarm
about migrant Czech industrial workers from Bohemia who were allegedly intent on
founding colonies in Dresden and Leipzig and slavicizing this border region as well.*®
Despite their growing influence on nationalist opinion in the rest of Germany, the Pan
Germans and the Society for Germandom in the Eastern Marches did not attract
significant support from most German-speeikers who actually lived in Germany’s East.
In Posen, West Prussia, or Upper Silesia, for example, it was largely peripatetic repre
sentatives of the local or state administration from elsewhere in Germany—mid-level
civil servants, teachers, Protestant pastors—who joined these nationalist associations in
the greatest numbers. Estate owners in the region, as we have seen, strongly disapproved
of the Eastern Marches’ Society’s anti-immigrant stance, given their dependence on
seasonal labor from Russia.^® Similarly, German-speaking farmers, industrial workers,
and small business owners expressed little interest in the organization. ‘H-K-T’ stood for
a radical Germanizing politics that, unlike the Catholic Center Party’s program, was expli
citly anti-Polish. Many German-speakers in the East assessed the national situation in
more moderate terms than the radical H-K-T-ers and their outside agitators, as one
example from nineteenth century Posen suggests: ‘A recently arrived civil servant who
was as yet inexperienced in the ‘Polish Question’ didn’t see things through quite the
same lens as did a local merchant who, although a convinced [German] patriot,
nevertheless found it necessary to treat his Polish clients with care.’^*
By the turn of the century the nationalist associations enjoyed considerable success
throughout Germany in attracting members and in shaping middle-class popular
opinion about domestic and foreign issues, from Polish policy to colonial settlements
in Africa. Their leaders were usually local notables, generally Protestant, high-level civil
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servants, businessmen, and academically educated professionals. Originally, each of
these associations sought to influence policy by cultivating a close relationship to the
government, and most governments between 1895 and 1914 had reciprocated by making
resources available to nationalist organizations and by turning to them for help in
building public support for policy initiatives. Ideally, as we have seen, the associations
sought to add a kind of popular legitimacy to broad political coalitions {Sammlungen)
around popular nationalist issues, anti-Socialism, or both. This working relationship
had led some historians to characterize the relationship between government and
popular associations as a specific example of the governing elite’s manipulation of
mass politics.22 Yet this seamless picture of synergy between a powerful government
and an abject civil society hid the combustible threat these organizations actually posed
to the ruling elite if things ever got out of hand. Some members who took the expansive
ideological missions of these associations seriously did not want to fall into line when
the government pursued policies they considered to be too moderate. Furthermore, the
expanding social, confessional, and regional memberships of many of these organiza
tions brought frequent challenges to the elite national leadership.23
The most conspicuous example of the threat that these mass-based nationalist
associations could pose to government stability involved the campaign to expand
Germany s navy. Starting in 1897, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz had pursued a strategy
of increased funding for the navy that sought both to minimize the provocation to
other naval powers (Britain) on the one hand, while cementing a nationalist parlia
mentary coalition around increased support for the Navy at home. The Navy League
was meant to popularize Tirpitz’s growing budgetary requests. As with nationalist
criticism of the government’s allegedly halfhearted Polish policy in the East, a group of
radicals managed to gain temporary control of the Navy League by criticizing the
Tirpitz plan for its moderation in the face of international threats to the nation.
Demanding a more rapid and expensive naval build-up, the radicals explicitly ques
tioned Tirpitz s (and by extension the Kaiser’s) judgment about Germany’s national
interests, implying that neither man was adequately addressing Germany’s military
needs. In 1908 the Kaiser himself found it necessary to intervene in the ongoing crisis,
threatening to withdraw lucrative government patronage from the Navy League to
force the resignation of the offending radicals.^^
During the same period, the Pan German League also challenged official state and
dynastic forms of nationalism. The government had already angered the League at the
time of the Boer War (1899-1902) by not aiding the allegedly ethnic German Boers
whose cause many German nationalists had embraced. During the 1905 Moroccan
crisis the Pan Germans again criticized the government harshly for failing to obtain
tangible colonial concessions for Germany. At that time Chancellor Bernhard von
Billow had responded by deriding the Pan Germans’ ignorance of complex policy
issues. The last straw for many in the Pan German League, however, came with the
publication by the Daily Telegraph in 1908 of an interview with the Kaiser. In a
rambling monologue Wilhelm II disavowed his alleged support for the Boers a decade
earlier and even referred to a secret German contingency plan to help to defeat the very
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Boer insurgents that the Pan Germans had idolized. This revelation set in motion a
rejection by the Pan Germans of the dynasty and the government. The League had
traditionally opposed all democratic reform of Germany’s political system, but it now
found itself arguing that ultimate authority in national questions should be vested in
the nation rather than in the Monarch.^^
These challenges to the government posed by nationalist associations demonstrate
how easily mass mobilization around nationalist issues might threaten the very legiti
macy of the state and monarchy it was meant to reinforce. Since 1871 Germany’s
governments had repeatedly deployed nationalist rhetoric as a means to achieve greater
political unity and social stability. More recently, governments had seen in the nation
alist associations a useful tool with which to influence elections and forge useful
political coalitions. Yet their mass quality made these organizations increasingly
unpredictable allies for the state, and after 1900 they frequently embarrassed govern
ments and even occasionally produced political instability.
Radical forms of nationalism in Germany diverged from state-based nationalism
over other divisive issues as well. Decades of statehood had made official forms of
nationalism into a generally accepted civic religion in Germany, one whose basic
symbols, such as the flag or the monarchy enjoyed nationalist significance thanks to
their close association with the state. Not surprisingly, however, given activists’ em
phasis on the conflict with Slavs in the East, a radical fringe of nationalists parted
company with this state-based understanding of nationhood in the 1890s to define the
nation and its interests more in ethnic or even racial terms. In this view, not the citizens
of the German nation state, but rather a German Volk spread among several states
formed the national community. For these pan-German ethnic nationalists, 1871 had
constituted not an end point—the final unification of a German nation state—but
rather a first step toward the ambitious unification of all ethnic Germans in Europe into
a vaguely defined continental empire that might someday include much of the
Habsburg Monarchy and parts of Russia. This kind of radical ethnic pan-Germanism
developed in tandem with a counterpart movement in Habsburg Austria starting in the
1880s. There, the followers of the volatile radical German nationalist and anti-Semitic
demagogue Georg von Schonerer had proclaimed their treasonous adherence to the vision
of a greater (Protestant) Germany. Schonerer’s followers never made up more than a tiny, if
vocal minority among German nationalists in Imperial Austria and Schonerer himself
was brought down by scandal, imprisonment, and the loss of his noble title.“ Clearly, this
pan-German emphasis on culture and ethnicity as the determining factors in nationhood,
rather than statehood or citizenship, demanded a radical transformation of Germany’s
borders and its citizenship laws, aims whose attempted realization could radically destabi
lize both German society and the European balance of power.
Ironically, however, as radical activists defined Germanness in more geographically
expansive terms, they explicated their cultural understanding of Germanness far more
narrowly. Even as they claimed national membership for the millions of alleged
Germans who lived outside Germany’s borders, some pan-Germans sought to strip
German citizens who were not ethnic Germans by their exacting standards, including
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Polish-speakers and Jews, of their citizenship rights.^^ As an idiom of nineteenthcentury peasant and artisanal protest, anti-Semitism had often framed local social and
economic issues in specifically cultural or religious terms. The Conservative Party’s
Tivoli Program of 1892, for example, had proclaimed its intention to: ‘combat the widely
obtruding and decomposing Jewish influence on our popular life’ and demanded, ‘a
Christian authority for the Christian people and Christian teachers for Christian
pupils.’^® Yet this invocation of anti-Semitism that rested on the alleged victimization
of a Christian population by Jews had littie to do with ideas about the German nation as
such. Instead, this popular form of anti-Semitism invoked more traditional explanations
for the perceived ills of German society in an age of profound economic, social, and
cultural transformation. The political appeal of this anti-Semitism—to the minimal
extent that it did appeal to voters—rested on the recognizable religious and economic
images it conjured.
When factions in the Pan German League rejected the monarchy and the state in the
decade before 1914, however, their leaders turned increasingly to a new and decidedly
racial form of anti-Semitism, finding in it a coherent worldview on which to found
their radical activism.^® If they failed to expand Germany’s borders or to change the
legal status of Germany’s Jews, these radical nationalists could at least impose a racially
anti-Semitic definition of nationhood on their own organizations. Their own practices
of membership discrimination and boycott may have had few practical effects on
German society in 1900, but their insistence on defining the nation ideologically in
racial terms and their relentless focus on purifying its membership positioned them for
greater influence after the First World War when even the state began to pursue
policies that favored a more ethnic definition of nationhood.^®
Racially anti-Semitic thinking, while hardly shared by the majority of the population, or
even majorities within nationalist associations, nevertheless entered into public debate
about citizenship and what it meant to be German, thanks also to Germany’s developing
overseas colonial empire. When German rule over other peoples came to include the
creation of significant settlements in Southwest and East Africa, race became a pressing
issue. Settlers themselves increasingly raised practical questions of property ownership in
racial terms as a way to assert their interests both against indigenous peoples and against
the power of colonial and military administrators. However, when it came to the legal
status of children of so-called mixed-race marriages in the colonies, for example, newer
racial arguments designed to underwrite German power within colonial societies clashed
unexpectedly with traditional gauges of German citizenship based on patrilineal descent.
Both settlers and local colonial administrators increasingly sought to outlaw racially
mixed marriages among Germans and to deny claims of citizenship to the offspring of
such unions in the early twentieth century.^i The courts inside Germany, however,
refused to follow this practice, often siding with the German men who sought citizen
ship status for their descendants of whatever race. This situation posed two different
concepts of national citizenship against each other, both based on theories of descent.
The new German citizenship law of 1913 made no mention of this racial question,
although issues about Germans and race in the colonies had been raised during debates
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both in public and in the Reichstag. The law did formalize a right to citizenship based
on descent, but it did not explicitly answer the question of whether German men could
claim citizenship for their mixed-race descendants. Nevertheless, the debates around
colonial practices clearly contributed to the racialization of the concept of German
nationhood in both its global and European context among some nationalists.^^
When Germany entered the war in August of 1914, the Kaiser proclaimed that he
‘knew no parties, only Germans,’ offering an official wartime image of a unified
German national community. War soon offered nationalists of many different stripes
the opportunity to dream expansively about Germany’s future in Europe, but also to
delineate just what cultural qualities and characteristics they believed differentiated
Germans from their enemies in the West and the East. As the war ground on, however,
the extreme sacrifices demanded by the state of its citizens, both at the front and at
home, produced a political radicalization of German society, which also found expres
sion in competing visions of the nation. As in the past, however, the question for
nationalists was not so much whether Germany was unified, but rather the terms on
which this unity should be forged.
During the war, new issues also influenced competing visions of the nation. Women
gained increasing public visibility and influence, especially women of the working
classes and the Mittdstand, with men at the front and children at home who vigorously
protested the increasing difficulty of procuring basic foodstuffs. During the war, such
women came to demand government aid as a core right of national citizenship, owed
them because of their extreme sacrifice to the national community.^^ This link between
wartime sacrifice and expanded rights of national citizenship constituted a new way to
understand both the national community, and its obligation to its members. Would
workers gain recognition of their unions and a role in determining industrial policy in
return for their cooperation in the war effort? Would the restrictive suffrage system
that elected the Prussian Diet finally be broadened?
Conflict about the meaning of nation also centered on the issue of war aims, fueled
by a protracted political debate of the issue in the Reichstag in 1917. Should Germany
seek an immediate peace with its enemies, or should it continue to seek a victory that
would guarantee it territorial expansion and increased global power? In July 1917, in the
shadow of the Russian Revolution, a Reichstag majority made up of deputies from the
SPD, the Catholic Center Party, and the Progressive Liberals passed a so-called peace
resolution that demanded a cessation of hostilities that would forego territorial annex
ation or financial reparations. In direct response, radical nationalist activists founded
the German Fatherland Party in Konigsberg in September 1917 to lobby for a victorious
peace (Siegfriede) that would include annexations in western and Eastern Europe, as
well as in Africa. ‘For the government to carry out a strong Reichspolitik,' claimed the
party’s manifesto, ‘it needs a strong instrument. Such an instrument must be a large
party resting on the support of a broad majority in the Fatherland.’ Seeking to ‘mobilize
all patriotic forces without respect to political position,’ the organizers scoffed at the
weak nerves of the Reichstag deputies who had passed the peace resolution, claiming
that only they reflected the will of the nation.^^ With Admiral Tirpitz as its national
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chair and civil servant Wolfgang Kapp (future leader of a failed Putsch against the
Weimar Republic in 1920) as second in command, the Fatherland Party swiftly gained a
remarkable following.
The organizers of the Fatherland party remained purposefully vague about their
specific war aims precisely because they, as Tirpitz wrote, worried ‘that the average
German will become fearful when he hears the words Ireland or Egypt, and our
opponents will have an easy time portraying us as wanting to prolong the war.’^s
While the party’s rapid growth was indeed impressive, Roger Chickering’s study of
wartime Freiburg demonstrates, not surprisingly, that the new party often created more
conflict than unity even among its own supporters. The founding of a local Fatherland
Party branch in Freiburg undermined the existing fragile consensus among the other
parties on the legitimacy of the war there. ‘The city’s leading patriots,’ writes Chickering, ‘had attempted to revivify national solidarity, to recommit loyalties to the great
common cause of the fatherland.’ Instead, they poisoned the local discourse and so
saddled the symbols of national community with their own aggressive political designs
that national solidarity strained along its many fault lines.’^® One local Catholic
politician warned against stirring up the masses in the name of nationalism, arguing,
that were ‘this [same] kind of agitation [to] be imitated by the Independent Social
Democrats... we should have revolution in Germany.’^^
The eventual end to the war in the West, however, was preceded by significant events
in the east that played a critical role in shaping German nationalist attitudes in the
period that followed. The collapse of the western front in October 1918 was all the more
shocking to most Germans because Germany had recently celebrated an overwhelming
victory in the east. The Treaty of Brest Litovsk, signed on 3 March 1918, had substan
tially changed the map of the East, assigning territory as far East as Rostov on the Don
to Germany, and creating German client states in the western regions of the former
Russian Empire. Brest-Litovsk stripped Russia of half of its industry and a third of
its population, offering hope that massive food supplies would soon reach starving
Germans back home. The treaty also underscored the degree to which the border
regions to Germany’s East had become sites where nationalists might play out fantasies
of colonial expansion and radical Germanization. The Oberost, an occupied region
stretching from the Baltic to northern Poland, served the wartime Hindenburg/
Ludendorff regime specifically as the site of such colonial experimentation. As Vejas
G. Liulevicius has argued, the Oberost command was far more than an occupying
regime. It attempted to Germanize land and peoples through wide-ranging policies that
rigidly controlled population movement and sought to transform indigenous peoples
by subjecting them to cultural Germanization.^®
With defeat in the West, and revolution at home, bands of nationalist volunteers led
by military veterans, the so-called Freikorps, organized both to battle socialists at home
and to defend Germany’s borders in Silesia, Posen, and in the Baltic region of the
Oberost Command. In this latter goal their efforts were reinforced by the allies’ desire
to use the Freikorps as a temporary bulwark against the Bolsheviks whose forces were
intent on recapturing the Baltic region for Russia. The dual efforts of the Freikorps as
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they saw it—to defend Germany from Slavs in the East and Communists at home—
often became mutually constitutive in their nationalist propaganda. In the Baltic,
Freikorps units sought to hold ‘Slavic or Jewish Bolshevism’ at bay, and to protect the
German national community from incurring this ideological ‘infection.’^s Increasingly
during the war, right-wing nationalists had already attempted to write Jews out of the
national community, baselessly accusing them, for example, of avoiding military
service or open treachery.^® After the Russian Revolution many German and Russian
nationalists openly equated Bolshevism with Jews, arguing that a rising tide of foreign
Jewish influence in German society had produced the German Revolution in 1918-1919.
This concept of political ideological infection conveyed an increasingly racial and
medicalized construction of national differences in the East, based in part, as Paul
Weindling has eloquently argued, on wartime and postwar efforts to limit immigration,
seeing in it a major cause of the spread of infectious diseases in Germany
Yet another indirect legacy of Brest-Litovsk was the popularization of conspiracy
theories to explain Germany’s sudden defeat in the West. Some believed that since the
war had largely been fought on foreign territory, and because Germany and its allies had
won a great victory against Russia, the German military could not actually have been
defeated in the field, a presumption that military leaders themselves and especially
Ludendorff helped to promote. The collapse, they believed, must have resulted from
betrayal by traitorous foreign elements (generally Jews and Communists) on the home
front.
During this violent and confusing period after the end of the war, a German National
Assembly met at Weimar from February to August 1919 to draw up a constitution for
the new Republican Germany. This liberal document declared that power emanated
from the people, although in earlier drafts deputies had debated whether power should
emanate from the German people. This statement did little to settle the issue of
membership within the national community and national community became an
even more important part of general political thinking and rhetoric following the
wartime defeat. Under the new Republic almost every political party constantly re
minded Germans in one way or another of what was called their humiliation—indeed
their national martyrdom—at the hands of their enemies. The inexplicable defeat along
with Germany’s unfair treatment by the victors at the Paris Peace Settlement remained
central to different nationalist complaints in the 1920s and 1930s. At the same time,
German nationalists also began to popularize a very different concept of German
national community than the state-oriented one that had dominated most thinking
under the Kaiserreich. By eliding Germany’s political humiliation with the dismember
ment of its ally Austria-Hungary, German nationalists implied that the ethnic Germans
who had formerly been citizens of Austria-Hungary somehow shared the same rela
tionship to the German state, as did the former German citizens who now lived under
Polish, Belgian, French, or Danish rule. The equivalence nationalists asserted between
these very different populations and their experiences popularized the kind of ethnic
understanding of German nationhood that some Pan Germans had touted before the
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war, suggesting that all of these people suffered similar fates as victims, and that all
ultimately belonged to the German nation state.
This new vision effectively answered the allies’ promotion of a peace settlement
allegedly founded on democratic principles that favored the self-determination of
nations. Some on the left understood German claims to more territory and people in
terms of a republican vision of nationhood that hearkened back to grossdeutsch
traditions first articulated in 1848.^2 Like German nationalists on the right, they argued
that the Paris Settlements had ignored democratic principles when they placed millions
of German speakers under the rule of Polish or Czech nationalists. As with the allies’
justifications of the settlement, this argument too rested on questionable logic,
presuming as it did that the common use of the German language somehow made
these different German-speaking groups in Central Europe members of a single
national community. German nationalists increasingly referred to such popula
tions—ranging in size from 6 million Germans in Austria or 3 million Germans in
Czechoslovakia to smaller enclaves of German speakers in Poland, Romania, and
Yugoslavia—as Streudeutsche (literally ‘scattered Germans’) or Sprachinsel (‘language
island’) Germans.^^ The use of such terms implied that the allies had forcibly dispersed
the German national community among its hostile neighbor states, thereby creating a
German diaspora of minority communities.
The idea of a German diaspora—of German populations scattered among alien
rulers—had never been particularly popular before the war, except among radical fringe
elements in Germany and Imperial Austria. It had never carried much weight because
before 1918 most of the populations in question had been citizens of Germany’s close ally,
Austria-Hungary. Perceptions of profound religious, regional, and cultural differences
also meant that most of the peoples in question did not view themselves as potential
citizens of Germany. Even in Austria or Bohemia many nationalists saw themselves as
only distantly related to Germans in Germany, and few favored joining the Reich except
perhaps in a loose federal arrangement. Some community leaders in these states were
happy to receive financial or moral support from Germany, but this did not make them
future citizens of Germany or even beholden to Germany’s interests.
Many nationalists in Weimar Germany, however, claimed these Germans for their
nation state, and increasingly asserted Germany’s right to protect and foster their
cultural survival. This consideration alone—the ability to pose as protector of orphan
Streudeutsche communities in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, or Romania—even
justified Germany’s entry into the despised League of Nations for nationalists who
othervdse abhorred the institution. It also underlay the logic of Gustav Stresemann’s
foreign policy initiatives through the 1920s that sought accommodation in the West,
while leaving border questions in the East open. Should the map of Europe be redrawn
at a later date, many nationalists also believed that the continued existence of strong
German enclaves across the border in Poland, for example, would help to justify
territorial revision in Germany’s favor. It was therefore critical to support the
continued existence of those minorities and to prevent them from emigrating to
Germany. Not surprisingly, perhaps, Weimar Germany became for a time the

512

PIETER M. JUDSON

acknowledged champion of the rights of European minorities, and it frequently
sponsored minority petitions to the League.^^
Forced decolonization in Africa and Asia after the war also produced a tendency
among nationalists to define their nation in cultural, rather than political terms, and to
re-imagine German’s global role in terms closer to home. In the past, the exercise of
political power over territories in Africa and Asia had defined Germany’s relationship
to its colonies. With Germany’s colonies parceled out to the victors, however, post-war
nationalists turned increasingly to culture as the measure of a territory’s German
identity. Some argued, for example, that the presence of German cultural practices in
agriculture, husbandry, schooling, in short in all aspects of life, meant that Southwest
Africa remained fundamentally German in character, even if it was now ruled by
Britain.^5 More frequently, however, nationalist activists applied these cultural argu
ments to claim territories and populations in Eastern Europe for Germany. In the fall of
1918 Gustav Stresemann had written that: ‘Perhaps in the future Germany will turn
rather more to the east and we will find there some substitute for what we will not be
able to obtain for the time being in competition overseas.’^* Many nationalist organiza
tions within Germany followed this new colonial logic, taking up so-called Volkstumsarbeit, or cultural work on Germany’s eastern frontiers, in order to recover or protect
German culture from the alleged threat of denationalization. Volkstumsarbeit became a
particularly important form of activism in communities where German speakers on
either side of the new frontier constituted a local minority of the population. In such
places, often rural villages, activists distributed periodicals, founded small libraries,
built Kindergartens, schools, and daycare facilities, and sought to create employment,
job education, or apprenticeships for German youth. They also tried to create a greater
sense of national community among locals by involving them together in holiday
rituals or creating associations to promote local music, dance, or crafts.^^
But, what were the signs of a local German cultural presence in the East? In theory,
they ranged from exacting domestic habits, the production of tasteful (not kitschy or
Slavic) domestic crafts or the ability to transform unfriendly rural landscapes into
productive gardens. Building on nineteenth-century tropes that had made German
culture recognizable in the whiteness of a German woman’s linens or the ‘laughing
meadows and flourishing fields [German farmers] have wrested from a wild nature,’ (as
opposed to the sordid mess—polnische Wirtschaft—they claimed characterized the
fields of their Slavic neighbors), German nationalists sounded the alarm. Nationalists
warned the public that Germans everywhere in the East found themselves in mortal
danger of losing their cultural distinctiveness to the hostile nationalization policies of
enemy nation states.^® They researched histories {Ostforschung) that documented and
justified a German presence in the East, wrote literature that praised the historic
accomplishments of German colonists there, drew maps that constantly reminded
the public of the Eastern territories where German culture might be found, and
produced tourist literature that extolled the cultural German qualities of Eastern
destinations.^* Nationalists constantly reminded their readers in Germany that,
as Bohemian poet Wilhelm Pleyer’s 1932 poetry collection ‘Deutschland ist groPerV
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(Germany is bigger!) suggested, there was more to the German nation than just the
people who lived within the borders enforced by the victors at Versailles. The map on
the cover of Pleyer’s poetry volume served as a typical graphic example of these claims.
Here, both the lost territories (Alsace Lorraine, Eupen-Malmedy, Schleswig, Danzig,
Upper Silesia, the Polish Corridor, and Memel) were shaded in the same tone as were
all of Austria and the allegedly German-speaking regions of Czechoslovakia, Italy,
Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, and the Baltics. Together these regions constituted the
true and legitimate territorial span of the German nation.^®
Both the republican government and later the Nazi regime subsidized nationalist
cultural organizations that claimed to support ethnic German communities in the
borderlands, starting in 1920-1921 when the radical Pan German League—now re
named the Verein fur das Deutschtum im Ausland (VDA)—and the new Deutscher
Schutzbund fiir das Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtum mobilized voters for plebiscites in
East and West Prussia, and in Silesia.®^ There is less evidence that German-speaking
inhabitants of these frontier regions necessarily saw themselves as threatened in a
specifically national sense. In Upper Silesia, for example, the democratization of
Prussia after the revolution of 1918, the increased influence of the Catholic Center
Party in Germany, and a plebiscite regime that guaranteed the region meaningful local
autonomy, helped to produce a surprise majority vote for Germany in several Polish
speaking districts. Although activists interpreted this outcome as something of a
victory for German nationalism, local studies of the region demonstrate that in 1921
many voters believed that inclusion in Germany might better protect the region’s
religious, cultural, and economic interests. Despite the best efforts of German and
Polish nationalists (and their media) to paint the region as a hotbed of nationalist
unrest after the plebiscite, most Silesians, whatever languages they might speak,
remained indifferent to the blandishments of the more radical nationalists on either
side. This did not mean that they paid no attention to what the nationalists said and
did. Instead, the decisions of Silesians’ to support one nationalist side against the other,
or indeed to support neither side, often rested on their evaluations of their particular
interests in a given situation and not, as the nationalists would have wished, on the
basis of a long-term nationalist commitment that overrode all other considerations.^^
In the early years of the economic depression, both government and bourgeois
Germans turned increasingly to nationalist commitment as the solution for reviving
Germany’s fortunes. Although the Reich government had already proposed special
borderland economic aid for East Prussia in 1926, with the onset of economic depres
sion, nationalists elsewhere in Germany increasingly sought such funds for their own
regions, which they now designated as threatened borderlands. Regional and local
authorities in Prussia, Saxony, and even in Bavaria, invoked nationalist fears of
creeping Slavicization in their bids for funding from the central government. Their
applications to subsidize public works projects or to expand welfare or tourism facilities
increasingly invoked threats of Slavic infiltration and German denationalization. In
1930 Reich legislation designed specifically to improve conditions along Germany’s
border with Poland called for the greater protection of Germany’s threatened border
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areas in general. Almost immediately Bavaria and Saxony invoked the wording of this
law to apply for similar borderland funds to protect German culture along their
frontiers with Czechoslovakia.^^
A consensus in German bourgeois circles about the importance of nationalism as
somehow above the polarized and sordid political conflicts of the day eventually helped
the Nazi party to build an impressive electoral constituency in the 1930s. Before the
onset of the depression, Germany’s diverse and traditionally nationalist middle-classes
frequently viewed Nazism with mistrust and concern. The party’s extreme nationalist
rhetoric may have pleased such voters, but its socially radical image usually did not.
And on social issues the Nazi’s uncompromising rhetoric could sound dangerously
revolutionary and sometimes indistinguishable from that of the hated Communists.
The Nazi party was only one of several whose campaign rhetoric promised national
regeneration through the pursuit of ultra-nationalist foreign policies. Nevertheless, as
economic conditions deteriorated from 1930 to 1932, many came to see the Nazi’s
revolutionary edge in a more positive light. While many bourgeois Germans had
viewed the Nazi SA storm troopers as dangerous rowdies in the 1920s, by 1930 they
often saw in them the only force willing to battle the Communists and Socialists, in the
streets if necessary. As regional and national Nazi vote totals soared between 1928 and
1932. the Party also transformed its rhetoric to feature even more of a unifying
nationalist patriotism and a celebration of the military. In this way the Nazis hoped
to add voters who feared the possibility of communist revolution, who resented the
Weimar Republic’s social egalitarianism, and who longed for a revival of German
national greatness.
The electoral success of the Nazis in 1932 should not blind us to the ideological
differences that, nevertheless, still separated them from more traditionalist nationalists
whose parties they defeated. The Nazi vote that reached a high of 37% in the July
parliamentary elections did not necessarily reflect an unbridled enthusiasm even
among radical German nationalists for the Nazi party program as much as it reflected
an exhausted rejection of an impotent political establishment largely incapable of
pursuing the nationalist interests of its voters.^^ An older organization like the Pan
German League, whose radicalism was rooted in the Wilhelmine period and that had
survived the First World War, had not engaged in the new street politics at which
the Nazis excelled. Moreover, despite their recourse to racial anti-Semitism, the Pan
Germans had traditionally defined German culture and national identity specifically in
terms of Bildung or academic education and cultural achievement. It was, after all, this
traditionally German quality that gave Germans a right to colonize others, and that
entitled educated men to lead the nationalist movement. Both in Mein Kampf and in
countless public pronouncements, however. Hitler openly rejected this link between
Bildung and national leadership, often demonstrating contempt for precisely the class
of men that had led the radical nationalists before the war.^s The focus on racial
struggle produced a socially leveling quality in Nazi ideology that recognized no
traditional distinctions of cultural or class status within the national community.
This potential egalitarianism, which offered countless opportunities for social
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advancement to people who in earlier nationalist associations would have had to defer
to their social betters, made Nazism worrisome to more traditional nationalists. By
1932, however, many of these more traditional German nationalists nevertheless voted
for the Nazis, hoping that they would crush the threat of communism for good, replace
class conflict with national unity, and restore Germany’s rightful position in inter
national affairs.
Once in power, the new regime justified these hopes immediately, moving swiftly
and harshly against its political opponents on the left and using an aggressive nation
alist rhetoric of unity to Justify almost every other policy. In particular, the Nazis made
the realization of Volksgemeinschaft or national community their explicit goal. Al
though the term Volksgemeinschaft can be translated to mean a ‘people’s community,’
the regime made no secret of its view that the people in question was a racially defined
German nation. The Nazis characterized the implementation of this vision as a return
to an earlier, traditional social unity that allegedly predated the German Revolution of
1918 and the Weimar Republic. In its outlines, however, this Volksgemeinschaft sym
bolized a radical departure from earlier forms of national community. Members of this
community, it was claimed, would relate to each other primarily in terms of a shared
racial identity and not in terms of their differing professions, geographic regions, or
confessions. This unity would replace a republican order that had promoted unhealthy
social divisions and an artificial class conflict among Germans.
The Nazis swiftly altered many elements of traditional administrative, institutional,
and legal practice to help to produce—or according to many nationalists, to revive—the
national community. Domestically, this meant the abandonment of the legal Rechtsstaat and an outright manipulation of law and the judiciary to favor the interests
of the national community against those it defined as outsiders. The proclamation of
the Nuremberg laws in 1935 explicitly outlined a new racial standard for citizenship that
defined just who constituted the nation and who was now an outsider. The racial
definition of citizenship and nation also strengthened the view that Germany’s legit
imate foreign policy interests included the well being of Germans elsewhere in Gentral
and Eastern Europe. In the eyes of the Reich, they too were members of the nation and,
as such, should be considered potential citizens of Germany. Moreover, some nation
alists asserted that the territories these Germans inhabited could also legitimately be
claimed for the German state.
If the domestic promises of national renewal—of a true Volksgemeinschaft—rested
on what appeared to be an egalitarian vision of racial citizenship, they nevertheless
encouraged professional Germans to hope that the new order would counter the threat
of democratization they had experienced under the hated Republic. Many white-collar
professionals, for example, hoped that the new regime would limit access to their
professions and restore to them a degree of social privilege and respect that they
believed they had lost under the Republic. At the same time, however, the regime also
promised a greater measure of respect and nationalist privilege to racial Germans of all
classes, combining vigorous propaganda with its racial policies to navigate the potential
contradictions lodged in these varied promises. All of this produced an impression
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among much of the public that the regime was, indeed, changing the German national
community by restoring lost privileges to legitimate Germans, while removing Jews and
other non-desirables from the national economy.
The racial concept of national community turned out to be flexible in practice.
Because structurally the regime fostered an unregulated competition among its many
agencies and institutions, activists in different sectors of the regime could simul
taneously pursue competing initiatives, while using nationalist ideology to justify
their particular ends. In terms of policing, the regime publicized the first concentration
camps widely as sites where political enemies (generally Communists) were allegedly
subjected to political re-education. A stay at such a camp should remind Germans of
their loyalties and duties to the nation, often by reacquainting them with the values of
hard physical labor. After 1933-1934 and the decline of political opposition to the
regime, the inmate populations dwindled considerably. A few years later, however,
the camps revived again, this time by detaining people the regime labeled in racial
terms as asocials, rather than in political terms: repeat criminal offenders, the homeless,
addicts, homosexuals. These were all people who it was assumed regularly violated
social norms for reasons of heredity. The regime and its opportunistic supporters
increasingly defined such marginal populations in racialist and eugenic terms that
excluded their possible re-education and made their banishment to the camps perman
ent, rather than temporary in nature for the protection of the nation.^*
The increasing use of racial reasoning to explain what was considered deviant social
behavior in German society also produced potential contradictions in the ongoing
definition of national community. If heredity explained chronic social deviance in an
individual, then to protect its health, the nation must prevent those individuals from
reproducing. Eugenic practices—especially forced sterilization—became a standard
means to accomplish this attempt to breed certain threatening characteristics out of
the community. The logic behind such policies rested on an unrecognized yet typical
ideological contradiction frequently found in nationalism that balances awkwardly
between assertions of superiority, on the one hand, and fears about vulnerability and
victimization, on the other. Just as nineteenth-century anti-Semitism had limited the
numbers of people one could count as Germans at tbe very time when activists sought to
increase the number of Germans in frontier regions, for example, so too did this turn to
eugenic policies—from sterilization to euthanasia—contradict the Nazi attempts
through other policies (marriage loans) to increase the size of the German population.^’’
The centrality of a race to the national community produced myriad professional
opportunities for many Germans, since it demanded both new experts qualified to
diagnose hereditary qualities that made people asocial, as well as a growing bureaucracy
required to police racially dangerous asocials. However, whether the majority of Ger
mans shared such extreme racial beliefs about the national community is doubtful.
Peter Fritzsche has recently argued that at the very least, Nazi pronouncements and
policies forced average Germans to engage with concepts of race and nation in daily life
situations, whether or not race held any significance for them personally. As citizens of
a racial state, most Germans, for example, found it necessary at some point to construct
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family trees to confirm their Aryan identity (and their suitability for marriage).^*
Others encountered race in the context of local economic boycotts, signs banishing
Jews from using public accommodations, in Nazi media, or in the open violence of the
November pogrom in 1938.
Many bourgeois and politically conservative German groups praised the new re
gime—and the new Volksgemeinschaft; they appreciated order in the streets, the
disappearance of the Communists, and the frequent nationalist rituals. Many more
Germans remembered the period 1933-1939 in positive terms.^^ The regime did,
however, make greater demands on some citizens than on others in its efforts to realize
national community. Formerly Socialist, Communist working-class or unemployed
Germans often had little choice, but sullenly to accept the regime. Although Nazi
propaganda suggests that the regime sought constantly to mobilize Germans for
nationalist goals in their daily lives, the evidence shows that the regime aimed more
to demobilize those social groups least likely to accept Nazi rule. Nazi programs, such
as the German Labor Front s Strength Through Joy,’ attempted to co-opt workingclass Germans through consumer oriented policies that would both make them more
effective workers and ensure the regime a minimum of cooperation among the
populations most likely to resent Nazi rule. The ‘Strength Through Joy’ programs
created opportunities for tourism and travel for workers who had little access to leisure
travel of any kind, allowing them a chance to experience their place in the larger
national community personally by getting to know other parts of Germany. A select
few workers even gained the chance to travel abroad on cruises, often to destinations
where they might experience Germany’s global racial superiority for themselves.*®
Nazi foreign policy victories in the 1930s, from the return of the Saar to Germany
(1935) to the remilitarization of the Rhineland (1936), offered German nationalists the
perception of a steady revision of the unfair terms of the 1919 treaties. For many jubilant
nationalists these victories presaged potential future border revisions and the annex
ation of more of Europe s Germans to Germany. Despite some fears about the possible
outbreak of war, Germans welcomed Anschluss with Austria and annexation of the
German-speaking regions of Czechoslovakia (1938). These victories could be under
stood in traditional German nationalist terms as redressing iniquities of the 1919
settlement and restoring Germany’s position in Europe, as could war against Poland,
and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in 1939. However, most German nation
alists did not envision world conquest on the global scale that Hitler envisioned it. They
were, in a sense, far less imaginative and ambitious than were the Nazis and far more
focused on redressing the injustices of 1919 through specific territorial revision. Hitler’s
conception of empire was also was rooted in German nationalist visions largely
inherited from the nineteenth century, and based on ideologies about the East that
dated at least to the Revolutions of 1848. However, in Hitler’s view territorial revision
merely constituted a minor prelude to achieving control over vast territories and
resources in Eastern Europe that would enable Germany not simply to unite aU
Germans inside a national and continental empire, but also to become the world’s
leading imperial power.* 1
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With the outbreak of war in 1939, and especially with the invasion of the Soviet
Union in 1941, Nazi ambitions turned out to be far more difficult to realize than
expected, thanks largely to Germany’s lack of preparedness to fight a long war on
several fronts. Problems with the pursuit of the war also derived from the regime’s
expenditure of valuable resources on ambitious nationalist population politics: first, the
immediate resettlement of so-called ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) in newly acquired
Polish territories, and later the extermination of Europe’s Jews. Both of these policies
sought to realize different aspects of the broader Nazi vision of national community,
and the importance assigned by Hitler to both policies shaped occupation practices in
the East, and made prosecution of total war significantly more difficult from the
standpoint of the military.
As with their rule over German society, the Nazis’ wartime command structures
introduced several competing sites of authority (the SS, the Wehrmacht, the individual
Gauleiter or provincial chiefs in the East, the East Ministry in Berlin, the various
institutions of experts on Eastern matters). The infighting among these authorities
produced very different approaches to officially shared goals, such as the Germanization of annexed territory or the exploitation of local Slav populations. All of them
justified their policies and their use of scarce resources in terms of the racial ideology of
nationhood, and all produced profoundly contradictory administrative practices.®^
Although Nazi administrators arrived in the Sudetenland and later in the Protector
ate of Bohemia Moravia seeking to restore German national power and to destroy the
Czech nation, they soon modified their original intentions. Nazi racial policy when
applied to Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, for example, looked very different indeed
from its application to Poles or Ukrainians.®^ In the newly annexed Reichsgau Sudetenland,
deliverance by the Reich from Czech oppression and union with the larger German
national community produced ambivalence and uncertainty among many German speak
ers. While their new Nazi rulers attempted to win over local Germans (and Germanizable
Czech speakers) with generous funding for municipal projects, schools, and welfare
payments, Sudetenland Germans were in no mood to sacrifice for their new homeland
by serving in the Wehrmacht, or paying higher German prices for essential goods and
services. German nationalists in the Sudetenland had long complained that Czechs domi
nated the civil service and school teaching positions. This, they believed, would not change
if German men left for the front or to labor in Germany. Sudeten Germans also wanted the
Nazis to treat Czechs with much greater severity, something their new rulers were loath to
do, since they valued the highly-skiUed industrial Czech labor force. The resulting resent
ments produced regional sentiments easily capable of imdermining the feelings of national
community that the Nazis sought to realize. It also, ironically, meant that the Nazis were
willing to tolerate a certain amoimt of Czech nationahsm, as long as it was not directed
against the Reich.®^
In Poland, meanwhile, a very different situation obtained. In the annexed regions,
Himmler sought to remove Polish and Jewish populations to the East, dumping
them in the General Government territory with no regard to food supplies, over
crowding, or medical conditions. Ideally, after the systematic destruction of the Polish
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leadership—the intelligentsia and the political classes—the surviving Poles would serve
somehow as a flexible labor supply. Local and regional Nazi administrators sought to
Germanize the territories under their control using varying strategies. In Poland the
Nazis imposed a German Volksliste that divided potential Germans in the region into
hierarchic categories with different degrees of privilege, depending ostensibly on their
nationalist credentials, but often enough on their political reliability. In order to realize
its vision of nationhood that united all ethnic Germans, the regime also drew up
agreements with the Soviet Union to resettle ethnic Germans from Bukovina, Volhynia, and the Baltics (all newly annexed by the USSR) in the annexed regions of Poland.
Although Himmler believed that the resettlement process could be accomplished
swiftly; in fact, most of the ethnic Germans who trekked westward to build a new life in
the Reich found themselves living in camps for the duration of the war. To keep them
docile in the camps, where their frustrated expectations of land produced growing
complaints, the regime withheld full citizenship from the settlers until after the war,
when their record of politically loyal behavior would confirm their membership in the
national community. Here, as in the late nineteenth century or in the 1920s, expect
ations among nationalists in Germany about the racial and national characteristics that
allegedly separated Slavs and Germans on the borderlands produced confusion and
uncertainty when activists encountered real ethnic Germans in the occupied territories.®^ Young, often female nationalist activists who were sent during the war to do
Volkstumsarbeit or welfare work in the newly-annexed territories in the East, antici
pated that they would play an important role in a nationalist drama that pitted German
civilization against Slavic chaos on the frontier. What they actually encountered,
however, were profoundly ambivalent situations that confounded their expectations
about national community. Among the local Germans, as well as the Volksdeutsche
settlers, young activists might encounter bilingualism, strong Catholic loyalties, a
deplorably low degree of civilization, and a profound indifference to the National
Socialist revolution—much less to the concept of nation. Female volunteers in the
Wartheland assigned to help the SS clear out Polish families from their farms and
replace them with Volksdeutsche families often noticed that settlers from Volhynia
often spoke better Polish than German. The ethnic German settlers appeared to share
more with local Polish speakers than they did with the middle-class nationalist activists
from Germany.®® In regions occupied by Germany, but neither annexed nor slated for
resettlement, the concept of ethnic German became even more elastic. From the Baltics
to the Ukraine it was increasingly those who were most fully Nazified and who
collaborated most enthusiastically with the invader, who might earn the coveted status
of Volksdeutsche. Anyone who sought ethnic German status to gain local privileges
needed to demonstrate his Germanness palpably, usually by inflicting violence on his
Jewish neighbors or at least betraying them to the Nazi occupiers.®^
In the spring of 1945, as the Third Reich finally collapsed, German speakers were on
the move across Eastern Europe, often fleeing the Red Army or retribution from local
partisans. Thanks to policies of imperial expansion pursued by the Nazi regime, those
who had been resettled by the Nazis also found themselves again forced to abandon
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their homes and to flee to the West. Less than a century after the founding of a German
nation state, the proponents of the most radical form of German nationalism had
gained the power to convert their ambitious visions into practice. With the full force of
the state behind them, they had driven Europe and their own society into catastrophe,
thanks in large part to their insistence on bending the rule of law to the ideological
demands of their nationalism. Whether it was in the eugenic policies they applied to
members of the nation or in the genocidal policies with which they targeted its alleged
enemies like the Jews, the Nazis completely abandoned the rule of law for an order that
instead made nation (as their functionaries defined it) into the highest good.
The dynamics of an expansionist nationalism that sought ever more ways to purify
the national community, on the one hand, and ever more territorial acquisitions on the
other, had in part produced this catastrophe. It was the particularly nationalist com
ponents of these aggressive policies that shaped both their imperial and genocidal
characters. However, was German nationalism to blame for the catastrophes brought
about by Nazism? How exceptional was German nationalism? In fact, during this
period German nationalism looks remarkably similar to other forms of nationalism in
Europe, even taking into account the specificities of the German case. Racialized forms
of nationalism could be found across Europe, from Ireland to Romania. In June 1932,
for example, a Polish nationalist Silesian newspaper welcomed the strict separation of
the races promised by the Nazis, ‘in the interest of the purity of both cultures.’ Polish
activists believed that separation would finally end the national indifference that
characterized many Poles in the region.** Other elements of German nationalism,
such as the dynamic sense of victimization German nationalists had cultivated after
1918 or the assertion that the peace had unjustly consigned co-nationals to the oppres
sion of hostile neighbors, constituted critical components of Hungarian and Italian
nationalism as well. However, perhaps the most important characteristic shared by
German nationalism with its European counterparts was its tendency to conceive of the
national community in cultural/ethnic, rather than in political terms, even in societies
traditionally associated with more civic forms of nationalism. In recent years scholars
have effectively demolished the older dichotomous view—itself a product of the wars of
the 20th century—that contrasted a western civic nationalism with an eastern ethnic
nationalism. Wherever we encounter it in mid-twentieth-century Europe, nationalism
rested on the idea of a prior national community defined by shared culture if not
ethnicity, whether in Germany, France, Hungary, or Serbia. It was, after all, the French
in 1918 who found it necessary to engage in expulsions from Alsace, not on the basis of
loyalty or even language use, but on the basis of descent. The nationalist impulse to
realize this kind of nation in practice created all manner of dangerously oppressive
practices across Europe in the twentieth century.*®
If the Nazis were highly nationalistic, the character and murderousness of their
particular and extreme vision of national community were also no more German than
were other, competing visions of the German nation. This is not to say that there is or
was a good nationalism and a bad nationalism, the way some scholars have argued
since the 19505.^® All twentieth-century nationalisms contain by definition at least the
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seeds of what the Nazi variety produced, from the concentration camp to more benign
institutions like the flag or the anthem. To paraphrase Hannah Arendt’s insightful
observation from over a half century ago, the nationalization of European society that
produced national minorities and stateless people in significant numbers after the First
World War largely succeeded in replacing the rights of man with the rights of
nations.'^i This development did not have to produce genocide or ethnic cleansing,
but it certainly made those outcomes in Germany and elsewhere all the more possible.
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